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‘The making of dishonest insurance claims has become all too common. There 
seems to be a widespread belief that insurance companies are fair game, and that 
defrauding them is not morally reprehensible’. This quoted passage came from the 
speech of Lord Justice Millett in the Court of Appeal in Galloway v Guardian Royal 
Exchange (UK) Limited [1999] Lloyd’s Rep. I.R. 209 which still holds true today. 
This is evident in the latest decision in relation to fraudulent insurance claims from 
the highest authority is that of the United Kingdom Supreme Court in Summers 
v Fairclough Homes Ltd [2012] UKSC 26; [2012] 1 WLR 2004. It is needless to say 
that the decision has a wide ramification as the London Market is still a large and 
influential market for insurance products, especially commercial insurances and re-
insurance. This is not to mention a stipulated English jurisdiction and choice of law 
clause is frequently seen in commercial insurance policies. 
The case arose out of claims by a claimant (Mr. Summers) against the defendant 
employer (Fairclough Homes Ltd) due to serious injuries caused to him by accident 
at work. It was established to the satisfaction of the judge at Manchester County 
Court that defendant was liable. The judge ordered the quantum to be determined 
separately. From 4 October 2007 up until 25 September 2008, the defendant 
subjected the claimant to undercover surveillance. On 9 December 2008, the 
claimant submitted the claims in the sum of £838,616. The statement of truth signed 
by claimant on the same date indicated that he had to use pain killers, needed to 
use crutches, and had to wear ankle brace. ‘Standing and sitting was limited due to 
pain; he was still suffering psychiatrically from the effects of the accident. He had 
not worked since the accident and was unlikely to do so for the foreseeable future’. 
However, it was transpired from the surveillance that the claimant was able to work 
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without difficulty in October 2007. This was in consistent with the claimant’s wife 
diary which showed the claimant was able to work and he could even play football. 
The surveillance was disclosed on 23 December 2008 which led the claimant to 
subsequently serve the second schedule of loss reducing the value to £250,923 and 
the third schedule with the amount of £251, 481. On 23 February 2010, the judge 
at Manchester County Court found the claims to be substantially exaggerated. He 
nevertheless refused to strike out the claims as per the defendant’s request. Instead, 
he awarded damages for genuine loss in the sum of £88,716.76. 
The issue before the United Kingdom Supreme Court was whether the courts 
have power either in the Civil Procedure Rules or in their inherent jurisdiction 
to strike out fraudulent claims in its entirety. According to rule 3.4(2) of the Civil 
Procedure Rules:
The court may strike out a statement of case if it appears to the court – (a) that the statement of 
case discloses no reasonable grounds for bringing or defending the claim; (b) that the statement 
of case is an abuse of the court’s process or is otherwise likely to obstruct the just disposal of the 
proceedings; or (c) that there has been a failure to comply with a rule, practice direction or court 
order.
The United Kingdom Supreme Court had no doubt that for a situation like 
this the principles of insurance law relating to fraudulent claims do not come into 
play. This is so because according to the Court of Appeal in Manifest Shipping & 
Co Ltd v Uni-Polaris Insurance Co. Ltd and La Reunion Europeene (The “Star Sea”) 
[1997] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 360 at 372 the duty not to submit fraudulent claims would 
be supplanted by the Rules of the Supreme Court (or now by the Civil Procedure 
Rules) once the writ is issued. This point was not rejected by the House of Lords in 
the same case (See Manifest Shipping Co. Ltd v Uni-Polaris Insurance Co. Ltd and La 
Reunion Europeene [2001] UKHL/1; [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 389). 
As to the power to strike out the claims based upon the Civil Procedure Rules, 
the courts below refused to do so based upon rationale in the recent Court of 
Appeal case of Ul-Haq and Others v Shah [2009] EWCA Civ. 542; [2010] 1 WLR 616 
where Lord Justice Toulson explained in paragraph 50 of the judgment:
Where…there has been a full trial, the proper course for the judge is to give judgment on the 
issues which have been tried. To have struck out the claims…would have been to invoke a case 
management power not for a legitimate case management purpose (in other words, for the 
purpose of achieving a just and expeditious determination of the parties’ rights, or avoiding an 
unjust determination where a party’s conduct had made a safe determination impossible), but 
for the very different purpose of depriving those parties of their legal right to damages by way 
of punishment…which in my judgment he had no power to do. It was open to him [the judge] to 
impose costs sanctions…
As noted by the United Kingdom Supreme Court, the same approach was 
adopted by the Court of Appeal in Widlake v BAA Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ. 1256; [2010] 
3 Costs L.R. 353.
The United Kingdom Supreme Court, on the other hand, viewed that the courts 
are not constrained and can strike out the claims at any stage of the trial, even 
towards the very end. However, striking out a claim at the very end of the trial 
must be done in extremely exceptional circumstances. To this point, the United 
Kingdom Supreme Court came to prefer the approach in Masood and Others v Zahoor 
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and Others [2009] EWCA Civ. 650; [2010] 1 WLR 746 to that of the Court of Appeal 
in Ul-Haq and Others v Shah and summarised the power of the courts to strike out 
the claim in paragraphs 41-43 as follows:
41. The language of the CPR supports the existence of a jurisdiction to strike a claim out for abuse 
of process even where to do so would defeat a substantive claim…It follows from the language 
of the rule that in such a case the court has power to strike out the statement of a case. There is 
nothing in the rule itself to qualify the power. It does not limit the time when an application for 
such an order must be made. Nor does it restrict the circumstances in which it can be made…
42. Under the CPR the court has a wide discretion as to how its powers should be exercised….So 
the position is that the court has the power to strike out a statement of case for abuse of process 
but at the same time has a wide discretion as to which of its many powers to exercise. The 
position is the same under the inherent jurisdiction of the court…
43. We agree with the Court of Appeal in Masood v Zahoor…that, while the court has power to 
strike a claim out at the end of a trial, it would only do so if it were satisfied that the party’s abuse 
of process was such that he had thereby forfeited the right to have his claim determined…
The defendant in this case submitted that the court should exercise the power 
to strike out the claim in order to deter fraudulent claims. This was however not 
followed by the United Kingdom Supreme Court because it was established as a fact 
that the claimant did suffer injuries and the judge at first instance could determine 
genuine damages. This is supported by Article 1 of the First Protocol to the 
European Convention on Human Rights, Rome 4 November 1950, on ‘Enforcement 
of certain Rights and Freedoms not included in Section I of the Convention’. This 
Article states: ‘Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment 
of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public 
interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law…’ The United Kingdom 
Supreme Court held that the term ‘possession’ as in Article 1 encompassed a 
‘judgment’. In the instance case, the claimant obtained a judgment on liability.
The United Kingdom Supreme Court did not overlook the fact that exaggerated 
claims must be deterred. However, such deterrent measures can be taken in 
many forms. Apart from that the courts should ensure only genuine damages are 
awarded and that the courts may make appropriate order as to costs along with 
reducing interests, it is also open to the other party in litigation to pursue criminal 
proceedings for contempt.
It is no doubt that fraudulent claims must be deterred. However, most cases on 
fraudulent claims where the assureds got caught involved consumer assureds. It 
is submitted here that insurers should draw assureds’ attention to submit genuine 
claims before insurance contracts are concluded.
